Can political gender equality produce educational gender equality? Evidence from developing regions.
Revision for “Can political gender equality produce educational gender equality? Evidence from developing regions.” created on July 2, 2020 @ 06:38:37
Can political gender equality produce educational gender equality? Evidence from developing regions.
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<p style="text-align: right;"><strong>By Maike Kusserow</strong></p>
<h4><em><strong>Contents:</strong></em></h4> Regarding education, though great headway has been made in the past two decades in achieving gender parity, girls remain disadvantaged in regions like Sub-Saharan Africa, where according to UNICEF in 2018, 94 girls for every 100 boys, attended primary school, and only 85 attended secondary school [2]. Furthermore, UNESCO shows that in 2016, 9 million girls, as compared with 6 million boys, are expected to remain completely excluded from education [3]. On the other hand, Sub-Saharan Africa has proven itself a frontrunner in gender equality in the political sphere. The 1990s and early 2000s saw many countries in the region adopt affirmative action policies, introducing women into local and national government bodies [4]. These policies have paved the way to achieving female representation figures that far surpass many Western countries. Rwanda most prominently tops global rankings at 61% female seats in parliament – its 30% quota in all decision-making bodies having been implemented in 2003. The likes of South Africa, Mozambique, Burundi, Uganda and more, all stand above 35% compared to the US at 24% for instance [5]. Sub-Saharan Africa’s leadership in women’s political representation and concurrent trailing in educational gender equality, begs the question of how these two domains of gender equality are related. In particular, can female political representation put more girls in school? In Africa, research on the effect of female representation on women’s education is scarce. Dimitrova-Grajzl and Obasanjo (2019) analyze data on GII components for African countries and find no correlation between the presence of a gender quota and women’s education [4]. When they differentiate between types of quotas, they do find that legislative candidate quotas (whereby parties must nominate a certain percentage of women as parliamentary candidates) as opposed to reserved seats (where a certain percentage of seats are reserved for women-only elections), are associated with higher secondary enrollment for girls. They argue that different quota designs lend different degrees of legitimacy to women MPs, which impacts their effectiveness as MPs. To investigate the potential role of female political representation in lifting these ratios, I study Uganda’s 1989 implementation of a parliamentary gender quota. The policy, whereby each district has to elect a female representative, caused a large spike in representation from virtually zero to 34 female MPs (or 12% of seats). I look at cohorts born between 1959 and 1987, calculating the average difference in education of women who completed their education before the quota’s implementation and women who completed it after implementation – those who actually witnessed the rise in female representation while in school. I then compare this difference to the same difference amongst men. Comparing women’s education alone, before and after the quota risks capturing the impact of countless other factors affecting education over time. However, by subtracting the female difference from the male difference, the factors experienced by both men and women can be differenced out. This adds some credibility to the claim of isolating the effect of the quota on women’s education. Results show that girls who were in school during the spike in female representation saw nearly one more year of education, a 4% higher probability of having finished primary school and 18% higher probability of having entered school at all. These are large, statistically significant, effects, considering that for women who completed their education before the quota, average years of education stood at 3.34 and primary-completion and school-entry rates were 20% and 57% respectively. Nonetheless, these conclusions should be drawn cautiously, given the difficulty of definitively isolating the effect of the parliamentary quota. Although the double-differencing method eliminates some confounding factors, a definite causal interpretation of the above effects relies on there being no factors affecting education which varied over time (from before to after the quota) while also varying between women and men. In truth, one such factor, which is difficult to control for, is the growing women’s movement and the fact that regardless of the quota, since as early as the 1940s, it is likely that women’s education was increasing at a faster rate than men’s as a result of gradually improving societal attitudes. |